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Will Atlantic Union Lead to War or Negotiation?

The conferences held this month in Paris, London, Bonn and Moscow brought to concrete realization four main decisions that have been in the making for nearly a year. These decisions are 1) the integration of the United States with the countries of Western Europe; 2) the return of Germany to a position of influence; 3) the initiation of a Truman Doctrine for Southeast Asia; and 4) the consolidation by Russia of its position in Europe and Asia while it withholds from participation in international organizations. Yet so fluid is the situation throughout the world that these seemingly crystallized developments remain subject to sudden and unpredictable changes.

U.S. Integration with Europe

From the point of view of the American people the most revolutionary development is the decision of the United States, which has been vigorously urging the economic integration of the Marshall Plan countries, to become itself integrated with the countries of Western Europe in both economic and military affairs. In an attempt to achieve greater economic unity, it was decided at London to draw the United States and Canada into "working relationship" with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, composed of the sixteen Marshall Plan nations (the United States now participates in the OEEC only as an observer, while Canada has no direct connection with the Marshall Plan). This arrangement looks toward closer economic cooperation among the Atlantic nations after the Marshall Plan comes to an end in 1952. In this connec-

tion, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced on May 19 he had informed the other governments at the London meetings that Washington "has a continuing interest and stake in European affairs which will not end with the termination of the European Recovery Program."

Simultaneously, in an attempt to achieve greater military unity, the twelve Atlantic pact nations agreed to set up in London a permanent military strategy board, the Committee of Deputies, composed of representatives of their foreign ministers with an American as chairman. This Committee will undertake to create a single balanced collective military force which would replace former separate national military establishments. Such coordination, it is hoped, will reduce the cost of the proposed rearmament program for each participating nation. As its contribution to this program, the United States is to enlarge its Navy and Air Force and will cooperate with other Atlantic nations in organizing a planning board for ocean merchant shipping. The over-all function of the Committee of Deputies will be the admittedly arduous and delicate task of providing the financial resources necessary for rearmament without impairing the economic and social progress of the Atlantic nations.

Acknowledgment by the United States that international cooperation requires a continuous effort in time of peace, as well as in time of war, will be welcomed by every American who has recognized the impossibility of the only other alternative—and that is return to isolation. The presence of this country in joint economic and military bodies as an active participant

bearing its share of sacrifices, and not as an observer urging others from the sidelines to sacrifice their national sovereignty, will serve as at least a partial answer to French Premier Georges Bidault's plea for the creation of an Atlantic High Council. At the same time the London decisions raise a series of questions—quite aside from the technical problems of a division of labor in military affairs—which it would be dangerous to neglect.

Guns and/or Butter?

First among these questions, from the European point of view, is the possibility of financing both a vast rearmament effort and sufficient peacetime economic production to maintain existing living standards. The London experts came to the conclusion that the Atlantic nations, collectively, possess the resources and skills to do both. If, however, a choice has to be made, past experience indicates that there is a tendency for military requirements to take precedence over civilian consumption needs—to choose guns instead of butter. Nor would civilians have much to say about these decisions, even in democratic countries, especially if opposition of any kind comes to be regarded as unpatriotic or even subversive.

Yet the European governments are keenly aware that existing living standards, although considerably improved since 1945, remain for millions of their peoples the standards of poverty. Any deterioration, it is feared, would encourage political extremism. Would industrial workers then be impressed, it is asked, by assurances that life is even harder in Russia?

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European workers are generally well informed. They realize that Russia is a relatively undeveloped country, and they expect something better than Russian standards in their own nations, which have had 150 years of industrialization.

Will armament requirements, it is further asked, be invoked to whittle down modest post-war social reforms? The moment the North Atlantic pact was announced in 1949 some industrialists and Rightist politicians in Europe made it clear that they hoped to use it to fight communism at home rather than Russia abroad and "keep labor in its place" in the process. As communism has seemingly waned in France and Italy, impartial observers, among them the Catholic clergy, have noted with dismay that industrialists, instead of seizing this opportunity to seek *rapprochement* with the workers, have hardened in their attitude toward all unions, including Catholic unions.

Second—this question is asked both here and in Europe—can the military preparations blueprinted in London be reconciled for long with the maintenance of the freedoms which the Atlantic nations have pledged themselves to defend? Will these preparations leave civilian activities relatively untouched, or will they gradually lead to the adoption of restrictions on business and labor, on freedom of speech and on freedom of information, such as we witnessed in pre-war Germany, Japan and Russia?

An obvious answer is that, even admitting that military preparedness reduces or obliterates liberties, it is still better to be repressed by one's own government than

by a foreign invader. This argument, however, raises the far-reaching issue, much debated in France and some other European countries, whether, when it comes to a showdown, the majority of the population will agree as to the source and form of the repression with which it may be threatened. Under such circumstances the outbreak of an international war might well be the signal for civil war.

War or Negotiation?

The question most anxiously asked concerns the ultimate objectives of the military preparedness program undertaken by the West. The foreign ministers of the Atlantic nations reiterated their determination to preserve peace and to use the proposed collective military force solely for common defense against aggression. No one familiar with the war-weariness of all the peoples who emerged from war only five years ago can doubt the sincerity of this assertion. At the same time one cannot but recall that no nation in history has ever entered a war which it would describe as "aggressive" or "offensive." Every war, from the point of view of each of the parties to the conflict, has been "defensive" or "preventive." And by the time events have reached the point when the shooting is about to start, no government, even in the most advanced democratic countries, stops to consult the people through a nation-wide plebiscite.

The danger today is not that this or that nation wants war. The danger is that once contending nations or groups of nations have assembled forces and accumulated

armaments they consider to be adequate, they will see no alternative except to use them.

The creation of a balance of power, such as is now in the making in Europe, with the Western nations headed by the United States on one side and the U.S.S.R. and its neighbors on the other, can conceivably assure a certain period of relative peace and stability—but only on one condition: that both sides, when ready, are willing to use their respective advantages for the purpose of negotiating agreements about areas or issues in controversy between them. This is what Britain, which displayed great skill in avoiding war with its adversaries, did at the turn of the century when it negotiated settlements with France in Africa and with Russia in the Near and Middle East. If no negotiated settlements are contemplated and each side counts only on the other's "unconditional surrender," then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, no matter how good the announced intentions, war will result. It is in connection with the prospect of another war, which is feared by most Europeans, that the return of Germany to a position of influence, and the Schuman proposal for a Franco-German coal-steel combination assume particular importance. For it is now becoming increasingly clear that the French, through industrial cooperation with Germany, hope to avert participation in war, achieve independence from the United States, and develop trade with all areas, including Eastern Europe.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first of two articles on the Paris, London, Bonn and Moscow conferences.)

Norman Thomas Urges Disarmament and Stronger UN

Until President Roosevelt's death the United States with respect to foreign policy was Roosevelt. The President sincerely desired the triumph of righteousness and peace, but he made serious mistakes.

He scrapped his own idealistic, although inadequate, Atlantic Charter for the wholly negative slogan of "unconditional surrender." Churchill and Bevin are emphatic that the responsibility for this was Roosevelt's. The inevitable result was both to hinder serious and constructive consideration of the conditions of peace by the governments and peoples concerned and to prevent any effective appeal to the peoples of enemy countries as distinguished from their rulers. I wholly agree with Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias' contention in his

book *Secret Missions* that if our government had stated terms even as severe as those finally imposed, peace could have been obtained before the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and afterwards, with even less justification, on Nagasaki. I have reason to believe that this is also General MacArthur's opinion.

Mistakes in Europe and Asia

This policy of unconditional surrender logically led to the vengeful stupidities of the Potsdam agreement and to the more stupid attempt to carry out that agreement in the spirit of the vindictive and unrealistic Morgenthau Plan—an attempt which Mr. Truman continued until the summer of 1946. We Westerners invited the cold

war by the division of Germany into zones, with Berlin an island in a Russian sea. Worst of all, our government assented without a cry of protest to the evacuation of some 10 million persons of Teutonic blood from their homes by our former allies. Hitler had not had time to dispossess so many innocent persons.

Our failure even to protest this conduct largely discredited our campaign for democracy and humanity in Germany and nullified any possible beneficial effect of the Nuremberg trials. Our allies, after victory, were guilty of the same sort of crimes against humanity for which we executed the Nazi leaders. And we were silent.

In face of the evidence of the true nature of communism and Stalin's devotion

to it, Mr. Roosevelt had gambled that Stalin was just another Georgia politician, perhaps abler, but essentially the same as his fellow politicians from Georgia, U.S.A. Hence Mr. Roosevelt—and later Mr. Truman in the Roosevelt tradition—sacrificed everything in Eastern Europe to the hope of Stalin's fair and friendly cooperation. Our forces were held back so that Russia might occupy Prague. Poland was handed to Stalin without serious effort for a just solution of its eastern boundary, and then Stalin's Poland was allowed to annex Eastern Germany without even a strong protest.

In all the present satellite states there were democratic groups; they had talked federation with one another; they were abandoned by the West with little more than formal protest. For all of Europe hope lay in an approach to federation. Our government made no effort to achieve this. Instead it actively helped to destroy a European economy integrated by the Nazis for their own dreadful purposes which should have been kept as far as possible and operated under trusteeship for the rehabilitation of Europe. The strength of nationalism, the aggression of communism, and the poison of war's hates might have defeated the wisest and most timely effort. But no effort was made.

The usual excuse is that if Stalin had been offended he would have made peace with Hitler and refused to fight Japan. But, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson has recently observed, Stalin has shown an ability to face facts. Facing the facts of Japan's long check on Russian expansion, of Hitler's betrayal of him despite their quasi alliance and of American strength in Europe as the war drew to an end, Stalin, in my opinion, would not have made a separate peace.

American mistakes in Europe were matched in Asia. On the one hand our government supported the corrupt regime of Chiang Kai-shek without adequate and intelligent pressure for reform, and on the

other it made Chiang's position untenable by virtually turning Manchuria over to Stalin and demanding that China establish a coalition government with the Communists.

U.S. Policy Under Review

Current public discussion of American foreign policy has revealed great differences of opinion as to whether the United States committed errors in the past, and as to the course it should pursue in the future. The Foreign Policy Association has invited experts of differing points of view to present their conclusions on some of the major issues under discussion. The sixth of these articles appears in the adjoining columns.

At Cairo Roosevelt and Churchill offered nothing to satisfy the nationalist ambitions of the Asian peoples except rescue from Japan. To Korea, indeed, independence was promised, but no arrangements were made to set up a provisional government. The result was the division of Korea. The whole policy was made to order to give ammunition to Communist propaganda.

Steps for the Future

These are things I have a right to say because I steadily argued for different policies. To say that nothing better was possible is the final pessimism. It was not decreed by fate that after military victory America should be in at least as grave danger of a new world war as if Hitler had won without our intervention.

Our present policy has its good elements, such as the Marshall Plan and our comparative loyalty to the United Nations. In 1945 it was worth trying to get a better United Nations even at the risk of Stalin's disapproval. To be sure, that effort might have met defeat in the American Senate. As matters now stand, it is important to

preserve and strengthen the UN which we have. This would not be the result if an effort were made to turn the Atlantic pact into the Atlantic Union with the exclusion of Italy from that union.

I thought that the values of the Atlantic pact could have been better obtained by other methods, but in the end I believed that the rejection of it in the Senate would have been a greater evil than its ratification. It is, however, fantastic to believe, now that Russia has the atomic bomb, that France and Italy, with their high percentage of Communists, will do anything in the event of war but seek neutrality. At least that is true unless we can win for the United States a far more passionate devotion to our leadership for peace with freedom than now exists.

To this end, our foreign policy should be built around two main and closely interrelated projects. First, we should transfer the conflict (which cannot and should not be avoided as against any aggressive totalitarianism, whether Communist or Fascist) from the plane of atomic war. This means the end of the arms race—that is, disarmament in every nation down to a police level for maintaining internal order, under the supervision and control of a strengthened United Nations. Even the appeal for this, if not immediately successful, would enormously strengthen our position in the world. Second, we should promise to spend, in cooperation with other nations under the direction of the UN, a large part of what we save on the arms race in constructive projects for the agricultural and industrial development which will enable men universally to conquer hunger. These two central policies would create a more favorable atmosphere in which to promote European unity and successfully terminate our occupation of Germany and Japan.

NORMAN THOMAS

(Mr. Thomas, longtime leader of the Socialist party, is now chairman of the Postwar World Council.)

Defense of Democracy in Americas Urged at Havana

The seed of a new idea was planted in the kindly tropical atmosphere of Havana, Cuba, when delegates to the three-day Inter-American Conference for Democracy and Freedom approved on May 14 a proposal to found an organization of private citizens to defend and strengthen democratic processes in the Americas. While United States public opinion has been ab-

sorbed by momentous events in Europe and the Far East, Latin America, untended, has been undergoing a crisis which threatens to get worse before it gets better. The nongovernmental character of this conference of the non-Communist Left made it an occasion without precedent in inter-American history.

The conference represented a diverse

group from seventeen countries who had in common a desire to defend the areas where at least an approximation of democratic processes still exists in Latin America against encroachments, especially from the Right. They were anxious to preserve a free press, parliament, political parties and trade unions, and to call to the attention of the American states and the United

Nations cases where governments violate international agreements to respect human and social rights. An outstanding feature of the Havana meeting was the strength of organized opinion represented by the delegations from Latin America where such organization is still young. They embraced civic organizations, such as the Montevideo Junta para la Defensa de la Democracia which has supporters in many Latin American countries, national and international trade unions, and political parties. The United States delegation included representatives of the Young Republicans and the Young Democrats, the Socialist party, the Americans for Democratic Action, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the United States affiliate of the International League for the Rights of Man, as well as the AFL and the CIO.

To Defend Democratic Gains

The United States delegation came to Havana more concerned with the external role of the hemisphere as a whole than with internal stresses in Latin America and in the inter-American system. The Latins, many of them suffering exile not for the first time, understandably tended to err on the side of parochialism. They displayed, in general, less concern over communism than over fascism of the variety encountered in their countries, and less fear of Cominform infiltration in the area than of the possible repercussions of United States policy on their political systems. The tenor of draft resolutions and debates clearly showed that if "Yankee imperialism" is no longer a reality, Latin American resentment on this score is still lively.

Criticism was also voiced of the so-called "automatic recognition" policy adopted at the 1948 Inter-American Conference of Bogotá and of Washington's action in recognizing the army coups in Peru and Venezuela, thus lending encouragement, in the Latin American view, to similar grabs for power elsewhere. But the giving or withholding of recognition is obviously a double-edged instrument, and the delegates present could agree only that this oldest and most intractable problem of the inter-American system needed further consideration.

A more immediate question was raised by the imminent prospect of a United States "credit" of \$125 million to the Argentine—formally announced on May 17. Representatives of Chile, which in recent years has received considerable material assistance from the United States and, at the same time, has been subjected to some economic pressure from the Perón regime, proposed a resolution advocating denial of financial, technical or military assistance to undemocratic governments. This was adopted by the conference.

New Vigilante Organization

The Declaration of Havana approved by the delegates at the closing session in the early hours of May 15 constituted an indictment of Latin American militarism which domestic constitutions have been unable to check. It repudiated "all forms of imperialism; regimes of totalitarian make-up: Fascist, Falangist, Nazi and Communist; the survival of the colonial system in some regions of America and anything which might impede the free determination of peoples." The delegates recognized that democracy must be given social and economic content, and they specifically recommended maximum development of education, of social security and health services, and of backward production systems. At the same session the conference voted to establish a continuing organization, to be known as the Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom, representing like-minded national or regional groups, and in deference to Latin American wishes decided to locate its headquarters in Montevideo, Uruguay, with the veteran Uruguayan Socialist leader, Emilio Frugoni, as president.

OLIVE HOLMES

(Miss Holmes attended the Havana conference as observer for the FPA.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

CINCINNATI, May 23, *Japan*, Hon. Joseph C. Grew

PHILADELPHIA, May 26, *National Sovereignty and International Union*, Hon. Owen J. Roberts, Cord Meyer, Jr.

SPRINGFIELD, June 1, *New Horizons of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

News in the Making

JAPANESE TRADE INCREASE: The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, meeting in Bangkok during the week of May 14, voted to encourage the development of trade between Japan and other Asian areas. While the American delegation supported the motion as a means of enabling Japan to develop a viable economy, Britain, France and Malaya expressed concern over the possibility that Japanese exports might encroach on their markets.

EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS PERSIST: On May 21 the International Monetary Fund released the results of the most comprehensive global survey on exchange restrictions ever undertaken. The report, confirming the opinion of foreign traders and bankers, conceded that progress in eliminating restrictions has been slow. The Fund revealed that, contrary to the Articles of Agreement, exchange controls were being used for protectionist purposes. Member nations were urged to start a program of gradual relaxation of these practices.

ELECTORAL OVERTURN IN TURKEY: Foreign observers are speculating as to the significance of the elections held in Turkey on May 14. Despite one-party control of the country since Kemal Ataturk's revolution in 1923, the opposition Democratic party won 408 out of 487 seats in the new National Assembly, although its popular majority totaled only 52 per cent. President Ismet Inonu has now given way to the candidate of the Democrats, Celal Bayar, a former Premier who left the People's party in 1945 to lead the now-victorious rival organization.

COMMONWEALTH AID FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA: Concluding a five-day conference at Sydney on May 19, delegates from seven British Commonwealth nations produced a detailed plan for economic aid to the countries of Southeast Asia. This program envisages the expenditure of £8 million (\$22.4 million) in the next three years, 70 per cent of the funds to be provided by Britain and Australia. One of the first applications for assistance is expected to come from Indonesia.